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Abstract 
Service-oriented architecture defines a paradigm for building applications by assembling autonomous 
components such as web services to create web service compositions. Web services are executed in 
complex contexts where unforeseen events may compromise the security of the web services composition. 
If such compositions perform critical functions, prompt action may be required as new security threats 
may arise at runtime. Manual interventions may not be ideal or feasible. To automatically decide on valid 
security changes to make at runtime, the composition needs to make use of current security context 
information. Such security changes are referred to as dynamic adaptation. This research proposes a 
framework to develop web services compositions that can dynamically adapt to maintain the same level 
of security when unforeseen security events occur at runtime. The framework is supported by mechanisms 
that map revised security requirements arising at runtime to a new security configuration plan that is used 
to adapt the web services composition.  
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1. Introduction 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) (Erl 2008) has gained attention as a unifying architecture that 
addresses the challenges of deploying applications where rapidly changing business requirements are 
present. SOA applications are built by assembling or composing autonomous components called web 
services (Erl 2008) to create a web services composition. Such web services may be owned and maintained 
by different service providers spanning many administrative boundaries. It is therefore possible for a web 
services composition to invoke third party web services without any guarantee that the web service being 
invoked meets the expected security requirements. Enforcement of the security properties of a web 
services composition, using mechanisms such as authentication, authorization, confidentiality and 
integrity, can be affected and may need to be changed at runtime (Hoque et al. 2013). When such changes 
occur, it becomes necessary for a web services composition to ensure that the expected security is 
maintained. When a specific web service poses a security risk to the entire web services composition, the 
ability of the web services composition to dynamically replace such a web service with a more suitable 
and secure web service becomes a desirable feature. Even if such a web service supports the required level 
of security, and does not pose a security risk, the web services composition may still need to be 
reconfigured to implement new security mechanisms to support possible changes in the security 
properties.  
 
Despite the recognized need to handle unexpected security events that can occur at runtime, the ability to 
dynamical reconfigure the web services composition due to unforeseen security events is still an open and 
challenging research topic (Alferez & Vicente 2013). Most existing approaches to secure web services 
compositions focus on capturing and enforcing security requirements at design time without paying 
attention to how a web services composition could dynamically adapt to cope with unanticipated security 
requirements that may arise at runtime. From a security perspective, the web services composition may 
often be left incomplete and insecure.  
 
This paper proposes a high level framework to allow a services composition to dynamically adapt its 
security by reacting to changing security requirements that arise at runtime. The contribution of this paper 
is a set of steps to create models that sufficiently describe a web services composition’s security context 
to enable runtime security requirements to be mapped to flexible runtime security configurations. The 
framework further provides concrete mechanisms to automatically generate and enforce a security 
adaptation strategy to ensure the security of the web services composition. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the motivating scenario. Section 3 identifies the 
security challenges of web services compositions and section 4 lists requirements for a secure and 
adaptable composition. Section 5 gives a review of literature that attempts to satisfy the security 
requirements discussed in section 4. In section 6 a framework to create a web services composition that 
can adapt when changes on the security context occur is presented. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Illustrative scenario 
In order to understand the challenges encountered when developing secure and adaptable web services 
compositions that are able to react to unexpected runtime events, a motivating example of a virtual 
wholesaler services composition, consisting of Retailers, Suppliers and a Bank is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Virtual wholesaler services composition model 
 
The web services composition enables different retailers to place orders and make payments for inventory 
sourced from different product suppliers. The virtual wholesaler web services composition is a typical 
SOA based application that uses a workflow defined using the Business Process Execution Language 
(BPEL) (Song et al. 2011). The composing is designed with a set of security requirements which include 
(i) encrypt sensitive information in all communications, (ii) only invoke partner web services with valid 
digital signatures, (iii) authenticate all parties in all interactions among web services and (iv) retailers with 
a valid digital certificate can access the web services composition.  
Each web service participant in the virtual wholesaler composition is described in an interface document 
using the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) (Curbera et al. 2002). The security requirements 
of each web service is defined in XML-based WS-Policy (Rosenberg & Remy 2004) and WS-
SecurityPolicy (Rosenberg & Remy 2004) policy documents and referenced from the WSDL of the web 
service at the operation or endpoint level. Figure 2 gives a snippet of the retail web service security policy 
that requires that all interactions to and from it use Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
(Rosenberg & Remy 2004) authentication mechanisms.  
 
When attempting to find a third party web service to use in a web services composition, the Universal 
Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) (Curbera et al. 2002) registry can be searched. A web 
service is chosen based on a match of the functionality it provides, and whether it supports the security 
requirements of the web services composition. For example, consider the security configuration of a 
retailer web service that satisfies all the web services composition SAML authentication security 
requirements listed above. When a user accesses functionality provided by the web services composition 
via the retailer web portal, he/she logs in using a username token. Via a single sign-on mechanism, the 
user credential is submitted to the web services composition as a SAML assertion, which is one or more 
statements about the user. The private key linked to the portal signs both the assertion and the SOAP 
message body.  The portal thus vouches for contents of the user message and the SAML assertion. 
 
Securing a web services composition such as the virtual wholesaler is not trivial for a number of reasons. 
The next section discusses the security challenges of such a composition.  
 
Figure 2. Retail security policy 
 
3. Runtime security challenges 
Web services compositions such as the virtual wholesaler are deployed in complex environments using 
technologies that may be prone to security attacks (Tiwari & Singh 2011). For example, WSDL 
documents, used to describe web services, can be generated automatically by current web services 
frameworks to reveal the entire application programming interface. This may provide enough information 
to mount a successful web service attack at runtime. Many UDDI registries do not provide robust 
mechanisms to verify the author of a web service, potentially allowing the addition of malicious web 
services to the registry. Such malicious web services could later be bound to the runtime of unsuspecting 
web services compositions. The SOAP messaging framework supports intermediary nodes between the 
sender and receiver making Secure Socket Layer or Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) unsuitable to use 
as it only functions using a point-to-point messaging model.  
 
The challenge with a web services composition is that security of the entire composition depends on the 
security capabilities of each of the composed web services. This dependency occur within the context of 
the complex and dynamic relationship between the composition and the composed web services. In the 
case of the virtual wholesaler composition, it is shared between the various participating retailers, product 
suppliers and banks. Ensuring the security of such a web services composition is non-trivial. Various 
events and changes can occur within the web service composition runtime context that can affect its 
security. It is therefore desirable to rely on mechanisms to dynamically adapt the security of a web services 
composition during runtime, according to problematic events that occur in those specific contexts (Hoque 
et al. 2013). As there is a strong possibility that such problematic events can occur, it is important for the 
web services composition to understand and keep track of security properties of each of the participant 
web services at runtime. Understanding the lifecycle of a web service’s security properties allows a web 
services composition to make an informed judgment about the likelihood that such a web service will be 
able to meet expected security requirements.  
 
In order to understand the development of a secure adaptable web services composition, adaptation 
requirements of a web services composition are discussed in the next section.  
 
4. Adaptation requirements 
Traditionally, the development cycle of a web services composition involves gathering of functional and 
non-functional requirements, modelling of the web services composition, searching and selection of web 
services at design time, and finally binding and invocation of selected web services at runtime (Immonen 
& Pakkala 2014).  Research by IBM has defined an architectural blueprint for self-adaptive systems 
(Kephart et al. 2007) that gives an understanding of the characteristics of a system that can dynamically 
react to problematic events in an execution context. From the architectural blueprint, this research 
identifies three properties that are applicable to secure dynamic web services compositions namely self-
healing, self-protecting and self-configuring.  
 
Self-healing is the ability to discover, diagnose and take proper actions to prevent a failure (Kephart et al. 
2007). Self-protecting is the capability to anticipate, detect, identify and protect against threats. In the 
virtual wholesale web services composition, self-healing and self-protecting ensures that the web services 
composition proactively identifies security threats and reacts appropriately without manual intervention. 
Self-configuring is the ability to dynamically adapt to changing environments by composing or 
decomposing web services. Figure 3, adapted from the work by Immonen & Pakkala (2014) shows the 
design and runtime phases of a web services composition that reacts to runtime security changes. At the 
left, composition requirements are gathered, to finally be used in composition runtime adaptation and 
monitoring processes.  
 
Using self-healing, self-protecting and self-configuring properties three adaptation requirements are now 
identified as follows:  
 Events that affect security need to be identified or detected at runtime using monitoring mechanisms.   
 Security requirements that arise at runtime need to be captured and enforced by having support for 
runtime security requirements. 
 The security of the web services composition needs to be reconfigured to maintain its level of 
assurance by using adaptation mechanisms. 
 Figure 3: Web services composition design time and runtime phases 
 
The next three sections discuss these adaptation requirements in more detail.  
4.1 Monitoring mechanisms 
To enable a web services composition to adapt to its security context it needs to capably detect changes 
in its operating context (Zhou et al. 2012). For example, when the retail web service in the virtual 
wholesale composition changes its security requirements and updates its security policies, the virtual 
wholesale web services composition need to dynamically detect such changes and react accordingly. The 
web services composition is therefore required to monitor itself and its context, detect problematic 
changes, decide how to react and act to satisfy its security requirements. This research refers to methods 
and mechanisms to monitor and detect changes as monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring mechanisms are 
deployed to monitor security property instances of web services at runtime.  
4.2 Support for runtime security requirements 
New security requirements may arise at runtime as security properties of participant web services change 
and new web services are added to the web services composition. When a participant web service has new 
security requirements at runtime, the web service is expected to update its security policy. If the security 
policy is updated, a compatibility check again the security policy of the web services composition is 
necessary to ensure that the web service still satisfies the security requirements of the web services 
composition. When selecting a new web service, the security policies of a set of candidate web services 
are matched against the security policy of the virtual wholesale web services composition, to identify a 
web service that satisfies the security requirements. Security policy matching and security policy 
compatibility checks require a vocabulary and a logical construction of security knowledge using 
relationships between classes and their subclasses in a way that supports formal reasoning (Cao et al. 
2014). An ontology can provide such security vocabulary and knowledge and is therefore necessary to be 
able to support runtime security requirements.  
 
4.3 Adaptation Mechanisms 
When problematic security events are detected at runtime, it is important how well the web services 
composition decides to react and acts to satisfy security requirements. The ability to decide and to act 
constitute the web services compositions’ adaptation mechanisms. Adaptation mechanisms include the 
definition and creation of a runtime strategy or plan of action that outlines a set of changes that need to 
be applied to the existing security configuration of the web services composition.   
5. Related work on adaptation requirements  
Research on adaptation requirements is an active field of research. The next sections briefly reviews 
current literature on monitoring mechanisms, support for runtime requirements and adaptation 
mechanisms in order to motivate the framework defined by this research. Finally, a gap analysis is given.   
 
5.1 Monitoring mechanisms 
The monitoring web services compositions to detect security violations is an active research area. Khaxar 
and Jalili (2012) propose that web services composition monitoring specifications can automatically be 
generated from descriptions of the web services composition. The challenge is that such specifications 
cannot be used to monitor choreographed services. Asim et al (2014) defines a monitoring framework that 
allows different user-specified policies to be monitored simultaneously. The challenge of this approach is 
that policies are defined in ConSpec language, which does not have clean semantics and is not a 
standardized security policy language.  
 
5.2 Support for runtime security requirements 
Methods to annotate security requirements on models has been explored by Menzel et al (2010) but has 
not yet been extended to capture runtime security requirements for a services composition. Aspect oriented 
technics to enforce security requirements have been explored by Yahyaoui et al (2012) and Almorsy et al 
(2014), however WS-SecurityPolicy based models are not considered. Various policy language have been 
proposed to define security policies by research such as Shah et al (2014). The main challenge identified 
is how to translate security models from one language to another. 
 
5.3 Adaptation mechanisms 
Research to address the challenge of adaptation mechanisms have focused on service discoverability, 
matching and selection of services. Chhun et al (2014) have attempted to solve the challenge of 
discovering web services, but they do not address searching by incorporating web services security 
policies. Cao et al (2014) proposes to match security capabilities as part of the process of selecting services 
but the automatic transformation of WS-Policy to an ontology model is not addressed. The concept of 
Software Product Lines (SPL) to define dynamic adaptation of services compositions have been adopted 
by Alférez et al (2014), however this approach does not consider the security of a web services 
composition.  
 
5.4 Gap Analysis  
A gap analysis on current literature presented here reveals the following: 
 Proposed models used to describe the security context of a web services composition do not 
sufficiently support dynamic security contexts. This limits the ability to map runtime security 
requirements to flexible runtime security patterns using security policies. 
 There is lack of concrete mechanisms to automatically generate and enforce a security adaptation plan 
which is necessary for secure dynamic adaptable compositions. 
 
In order to create secure adaptable composition, the above two gaps should be resolved. Currently there 
is no complete solution that holistically address the challenge of engineering secure adaptable web services 
composition. In the next section, a high level framework for dynamic adaptation of secure web services 
composition is presented. 
  
6. Framework for dynamic adaptation of secure compositions 
The premise of the framework proposed here is based on the observation that the security of a web services 
composition can be considered as a set of security properties and their enforcement mechanisms that offer 
a certain level of security that should be preserved at runtime. Adapting a web services composition to 
preserve a certain level of security can be viewed as: 
 Dynamically replacing a web service, where its security mechanisms that enforce a security property 
have changed in such a way, that the level of protection provided by the web service no longer satisfies 
the security requirements of the web services composition.  
 Dynamically configure new security mechanisms for the web service, to enforce a security property, 
in order to continue using the web service in the web services composition.  
 
To be able to address these features, various models are created by the proposed framework to provide 
abstractions of the security of the web services composition and the composition runtime behavior. These 
models are defined in six steps, discussed next.  
 
Step 1: Definition of the web services composition model 
To be able to analyze and understand the security of a web services composition, a WS-BPEL model is 
first defined to abstract the web services composition as logical units of behavior, as specified by 
functional requirements. WS-BPEL is chosen because it is an XML-based industry standard language that 
provides a notation and semantics to specify business process behavior based on web services. WS-BPEL 
orchestrates web services by assigning responsibilities and sequencing calls to web services to create a 
conversation flow chart based on message exchanges. Exchanged messages are described in the WSDL. 
The web services composition model links all web services that the composition interacts with partner 
links. The wholesaler web services composition can then be viewed as a WS-BPEL model.  
Step 2: Definition of a security context model  
Next, a WS-SecurityPolicy based policy is defined to capture security requirements. WS-SecurityPolicy 
is a widely accepted security standard that describes a set of rules used to define security objectives to be 
satisfied when web services interact. A challenge encountered when comparing WS-SecurityPolicy based 
policies is that WS-SecurityPolicy only supports the syntactic matching of policies, which depend on the 
policy intersection mechanisms provided by WS-Policy standard. Syntactically different security 
assertions with the same meaning are found incompatible, which hinders compatibility checks between 
security assertions. This limitation can be addressed by extending WS-Policy with ontology classes 
defined in Web Ontology Language (OWL) (www.w3.org/2004/OWL). OWL is chosen because it is W3C 
recommendation, is expressive and support formal reasoning. Changes that occur on security policies of 
participating web services are detected by converting security policies of web services into an OWL 
ontology at runtime and then formal reasoning is performed on the semantically enriched policies. When 
the changes requires the web services composition to be reconfigured or adapted, an XML-based file 
which contain information about security property changes is generated. Figure 4 below shows a snippet 
of a file generated when SupplierB updates the AlgorithmSuite elements on its security policy from 
Basic128Rsa15 to TripleDesSha256Rsa15. In this instance, SupplierB still satisfies the web services 
composition security requirements as the supported level of security is similar. The web services 
composition needs to ensure that a new key is used when communicating with SupplierB. We will refer 
to this file as the security properties changes file. 
 Figure 4: Security properties changes 
Step 3: Creation of a web service security variability model 
In order to capture the lifecycle of security properties defined for a participating web services, a model 
needs to be defined. For example, the general concept of access control, defined for the retailer web service 
in the virtual wholesaler composition, can be implemented by authentication and authorization 
mechanisms using username tokens or digital certificates. These two options can be considered as variants 
or variation points of the access control property and may require a different application programming 
interface to enforce. When enforcement mechanisms of a security property changes at runtime, the 
dynamic adaptation of the virtual wholesaler web services composition can be described in terms of the 
activation or deactivation of security property enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The existence of variations to enforce security properties of a web service makes it possible to use 
software engineering approaches that have been successfully used to design variants at design time and 
then assigning concrete implementation to variants at runtime. Dynamic Software Product Lines (DSPLs) 
manages both variants and dynamic adaptation (Park et al. 2014) and is therefore chosen in the framework 
as a technology to model security properties of composed services. Using DSPL, security properties such 
as authentication, authorization, authenticity, confidentiality and integrity are expressed using the 
Common Variability Language (CVL). A tool for CVL is available as an Eclipse IDE plugin (Haugen et 
al. 2012). Using CVL, a variation specification (VSpec) tree structure of the security of a participating 
web service is decomposed into access control, data security and message security as shown in Figure 5, 
adapted from Horcas et al (2014). Security properties are thus decomposed into an available set of 
enforcement mechanisms. The security configuration of a security property can therefore be defined as a 
selection of a set of choices on the VSpec tree structure model. The tree structure model is referred to as 
the security variability model in this framework.  
 
Figure 5. Security Variability Model 
 
The low-level enforcement mechanisms are the variations points on the security variability model. 
Variation points express decisions leading to different methods and algorithms chosen at runtime to 
enforce security properties. When changes for example on the confidentiality security property depicted 
in Figure 4 are detected at runtime, the composition is reconfigured by re-binding the confidentiality 
variation points on the security variability model with a new enforcement mechanisms of the new 
confidentiality  requirements.  
 
Generally, functionality to enforce security properties at runtime on a WS-BPEL engine is defined in an 
external security library and is made accessible using an applicable programming interface (API), a 
reusable component. For example, on Apache Orchestration Director Engine (ODE), Rampart, an Axis 2 
security module is used (http://axis.apache.org/axis2/java/rampart).  The information about such modules 
and the API they offer to provide low-level implementation of security property is captured in a model 
referred to as the security base model in the proposed Framework. Figure 6 below shows the security base 
model. Using confidentiality component as an example, the component contains the actual programming 
logic to encrypt message using a given algorithm suite to ensure message protection. 
 
Figure 6:  Security base model 
Step 4: Generation of security reconfiguration model 
One of the advantages of CVL is that it is executable. This makes it possible to automatically generate 
new models from an existing model. The security variability model provide information about security 
properties and the security base model provide information about security components that enforce the 
security properties. By executing the security base model and security variable model together and 
incorporating the information from the security properties changes stored in the file created in step 2, a 
security reconfiguration model is generated. Figure 7 below shows the process to generate the security 
reconfiguration plan using model-to-model transformation techniques by delegating to an Atlas 
Transformation Language (ATL) engine (Jouault & Kurtev, 2006). 
 
Figure 7: Security reconfiguration model generation 
 
The generated security reconfiguration model provides information that is used to adapt WS-BPEL based 
process of a web services composition. If a web service is to be replaced, the security reconfiguration 
model will contain the applicable WS-BPEL fragments specifying the selected partner link to be replaced 
and the context conditions which specifies the conditions that determine the instantiation of the WS-BPEL 
fragments to be added. Use of the security configuration model to adapt the composition is discussed in 
the next step.  
 
Step 5: Creation of security adaptation plan 
A plan of action referred to as the security adaptation plan is required to adapt a WS-BPEL web services 
composition. The security adaptation plan defines actions that need to be performed to transition a WS-
BPEL process configuration to a new configuration that guarantees security. The initial step to prepare a 
WS-BPEL process is to use CVL to augment WS-BPEL processes with variability so that the concept of 
a DSPL is used. The process variables, activities and partner links necessary to support the mandatory 
business process features define the WS-BPEL process base model. The partner links elements on the 
business process represents the BPEL variability model. Adaptation of the WS-BPEL process can then be 
viewed as substitution of WS-BPEL process elements. By executing the WS-BPEL base model and WS-
BPEL variability model and incorporating the information from the security reconfiguration model created 
in the previous step, a new WS-BPEL model referred as the resolved WS-BPEL model is generated.  The 
resolved WS-BPEL model represent the expected WS-BPEL process model after adaptation.  
 
Once the resolved WS-BPEL model is generated, the security adaptation plan is calculated by applying a 
difference operator between the model of the currently active WS-BPEL web services composition and 
the resolved WS-BPEL model using the Atlas Model Weaver by applying the approach defined by Del 
Fabro et al (2006). At the implementation level, model differences are changes in the enforcement 
mechanisms of the security properties. When the action needed to adapt the composition requires 
replacement of a web service, the security adaptation plan contains information that refers to a partner 
links in the BPEL process base model where new partner links are added to replace an existing process 
element or fragments. When the action needed to adapt the composition require dynamically configuring 
new mechanisms to enforce security properties, aspects are defined and populated with information 
necessary to intercept methods on the respective security component on the security base model.  
Step 6: Enforcement of the adaptation plan on the WS-BPEL 
Replacing a web service in a composition at runtime is not a trivial process because it requires adapting 
WS-BPEL process at runtime. Blocking of any task on the process to apply changes should not interrupt 
any running conversations, unless all internal state variables are in a consistent state and the necessary 
transactions scope that encapsulate the service are completed. The framework adopts DyBPEL, a tool that 
compliments activeBPEL execution engine with runtime adaptation capabilities (Baresi et al. 2012). Using 
the adaptation plan created in step 5, a new process definition is created at runtime by replacing the 
partner links with new partner links. This is possible since BPEL specifications are XML documents and 
XPath is a natural choice to identify partner links on the BPEL process. After creating a new process 
definition, the process is deployed and DyBPEL handles the WS-BPEL process migration. 
  
When the web services composition is required to dynamically configure new mechanisms to enforce 
security properties, Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is used to enforce the adaption plan. AOP is 
chosen because it was designed explicitly to address the modularization of crosscutting concerns like 
security. AOP introduces a unit of modularity, called an aspect, which can be used to modularize the 
security properties using join points, pointcuts and advices. Join points is a method defined on the security 
component in the security base model where the aspect will be weaved. A set of join points create a 
pointcut. An advice is a piece of code that is executed whenever a join point is reached. Advice, joint 
points and pointscut are contained in the adaptation model created in the previous section. To enforce new 
mechanisms when the BPEL composition invokes a composed service, a SOAP message being sent to a 
composed service is intercepted by the external security module. Using aspects, security configuration is 
weaved when the methods that provide security functionality are executed. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposed a high-level framework to engineer dynamic adaption of a web services composition 
within its security context. The framework uses web services composition models created at design time 
to abstract the security of a web services composition and to provide security meta-information at runtime. 
The security meta-information provides rich semantic information to monitor and reason about runtime 
security changes and is used by the framework to facilitate better web services composition adaptation 
using an automatically generated adaptation strategy. Mechanisms to transform the composition by 
weaving new security configuration into the web services composition has also been proposed. Unlike 
most existing approaches that focus on capturing and enforcing security requirements at design time, the 
proposed approach contributes a framework that pays attention to how a web services composition could 
dynamically adapt to cope with unanticipated security requirements that may arise at runtime. Future work 
will focus on ensuring that the adaptation strategy is coordinated across the web services interface and 
other layers of the application so that changes on one layer does not affect the security of other layers. 
Finally, the framework will be implemented in a prototype to determine how viable the framework is.  
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